Several Italian judges, including the members of the Supreme Court, have defined begging with children as a "Roma cultural practice". In response, the Italian Parliament enacted law no. 94/2009, which severely represses the practice. The article contests that begging is a Roma cultural practice and claims, instead, that it is an economic practice which may sometimes connect to other elements of Roma culture. The article critiques both the cultural argument put forward by Italian judges, and Italian law no. 94/2009, neither of which serves to defend the rights of Roma children. It concludes by suggesting a different kind of legal approach to child begging, more respectful of the constitutional duty of solidarity and protection of the family, and based on social policies rather then criminal repression.
This argument, soon criticised by politicians and newspapers for permitting "part-time child begging",3 meant to assert that there was no trace of a racket or slavery system of which the child might be a victim.
The second argument used by the Supreme Court was an economic one. Begging in this case was based on family needs: the mother and the uncle who received the money were not members of a criminal organisation who were exploiting the child, but relatives who begged in order to support their extremely poor family.
The Supreme Court also accepted a third argument, the cultural argument raised by the defendant, stating:
It is always difficult to find whether there is abuse of authority by parents . . . This is particularly true for some ethnic communities where begging is a traditional way of life deeply rooted in the culture and in the mentality of the people . . . It is important to consider the real situations in order to avoid criminalising behaviours that are part of a group 's cultural tradition". This statement appears to pay homage to cultural diversity, and even to legal pluralism (Sellin 1938; Pigliaru 1959; Rouland 1988: 76 ff.) , as it seems to admit that some ethnic communities may be ruled by other norms, the so called "folk law" (Dundes Renteln and Dundes 1995) or, in this particular case, "gypsy law" (Simoni 1999) . But shortly thereafter, the Supreme Court applied its "doctrine" regarding the relationship between culture and Italian law, stating:
Of course, if some practices, although customary or traditional, imperil the fundamental rights protected in the Constitution or under criminal law . . . criminal repression is unavoidable. It is self-evident that customs counter to the constitutional system cannot be permitted.
Then the Court observed:
The woman has used a 4-year-old child every day . . . for four hours in the winter, who was made to stand, and was not properly dressed . . . Without question, such conduct is contrary to the physical and moral integrity of the child, and causes great suffering.
For this reason, the Supreme Court changed the charge from "reduction to servitude" (art. 600) to the milder one of "maltreatment" (art. 572)4 and ordered the Court of Appeal to hold a new trial using art. 572 of the criminal code.
The judgement is ambiguous; on the one hand, it was written with the intention of sympathising with the Roma people. It was not the first time5 that Italian judges applied the cultural argument to begging in order to "save" the integrity of a Roma family at risk of losing parental rights, with the consequent declaration of adoptability of the Roma children (Simoni 2009 ). The Supreme Court stresses the importance of not criminalising their conduct. On the other hand, the Supreme Court considers the act of begging as a form of maltreatment. It is not clear from the judgement if the maltreatment lies in the begging itself, or in the way in which the actual begging was carried out (with no rest, no coat, in the cold). What seems certain is that the Supreme Court wished to avoid the mother's loss of her parental rights: in fact, as the woman had not committed any other violation of the law in the past, in the new trial she could benefit from suspension of the arrest, and maintain her parental rights -something 4. Art. 572 "those who . . . maltreat a member of the family or any child under fourteen or any person under his/her authority for purposes of education, care, custody or of learning an art or a profession, will be punished with detention from 1 to 5 years". The crime of "maltreatment" (art. 572) is milder than the crime of "reducing somebody to servitude" (art. 600), but heavier than the offense of "begging with a child" (art. 671). 5. Other cases are: Tribunale minorenni Roma (Rome Children's Trial Court), 30 June 1992. Diritto di Famiglia. 1994. 635 ; Tribunale minorenni Venezia (Venice Children's Trial Court), 1 Oct. 1993 . Diritto di Famiglia. 1994 she would have never obtained if the crime had been "reducing someone to servitude".
Despite its good intentions, this judgement yielded the opposite effect. The cultural argument caused enormous debate in the Italian public sphere which, in the end, led the Legislature to take action against the idea that culture could be an excuse or a mitigating factor in this case. Politicians denounced the judgement as allowing "part-time begging" and "cultural begging", thereby underscoring the different treatment of Italian and Roma children and parents.6 Furthermore, the Supreme Court was accused of cultural relativism, permitting the violation of children's rights in the name of culture.
With law no. 94/2009 -supported unanimously by both left7 and right,8 in the name of children's rights and dignity -the Italian Parliament introduced a new crime in response to this judgement:
art. 600 octies "those who use a child under 14 to beg or permit the child to beg or that others use him/her to beg, will be punished with from one year to three years' imprisonment.
The norm is written in a way that includes the hypothesis of a parent who begs with a baby in their arms: in this case, in fact, the baby is "being used to beg", even if it is not directly begging.
As seen above, child begging per se was already punished in Italy under art. 671 of the criminal code (which dated back to 1930), but the new legal framework, designed by law no. 94/2009, considerably increased the seriousness of the fact and its legal consequences.
While art. 671 punished child begging as a mere violation aimed at protecting the value of "public tranquillity", a milder version of public order, the new art. 600 octies considers it a crime against "the person". This means that the juridical good the new norm aims to protect lies at the core of constitutional values. Another important difference concerns the time of imprisonment, 6 . See Se era italiano la donna sarebbe in cella, Il Corriere della Sera, 29 Nov. 2008 ; Mendicante a quattro anni. I giudici: non è schiavitù. 'È la tradizione dei Rom'. Insorge il centrodestra in Il Corriere della Sera, 29 Nov. 2008; Il baby-accattonaggio non è schiavitù, in Il Messaggero, 29 Nov. 2008 . As noted by Alessandro Simoni: "The idea alone of using a cultural excuse for child begging caused a sort of hysteria among commentators" (Simoni 2009: 101) . 7. Particularly strong was the declaration by Francesco Rutelli, then member of the Democratic Party, and Senator in the left-wing coalition in Parliament: "Roma children who go begging should be taken from their families", Interview which increases by 300 per cent: while in the earlier art. 671, imprisonment was three months to one year; with the new art. 600 octies it is from one to three years, with an automatic loss of parental rights.
The consequences of the 2008 Supreme Court judgement are paradoxical: written to avoid criminalisation and to show the importance of culture in shaping behaviour, it determined a harsher legal treatment for the Roma people.
In this battle between the judiciary and the legislature, Roma activists intervened, denying that begging is to be considered as their cultural practice. In fact, the Roma people began begging only quite recently -they explainedfor economic reasons, after Italy's transformation from a rural to industrial society, when all the jobs in the fields in which the Roma found work in the past (horse raising, circuses, iron smithing) had disappeared. Begging, in some sense, runs exactly opposite to Roma culture, as it marks its collapse and crisis.9
The voice of the Roma people denying the cultural nature of begging remained completely unacknowledged.
In 2012, the Italian Supreme Court decided another case regarding Roma begging.10 Again, a lawyer raised the cultural argument to defend two parents accused of violation of art. 600 octies of the criminal code introduced by law no. 94/2009. The facts in this case are very different from the 2008 case, as here the child was forced to beg, and often beaten; although the solution (strongly condemning the parents) is also different, the judge still relied on the idea that begging is a Roma cultural practice. The Supreme Court observed that a Roma girl aged 10, was forced into the humiliating practice of begging, on the pavement, with the aim of collecting money that she was to give to her parents at the end of the day . . . she was obliged to dedicate herself to begging from morning to evening, under threat and material use of violence.
The Supreme Court's reasoning follows:
It is not possible to accept the argument of the defence that claims the need to consider the thousand-year-old cultural traditions of the people of Roma ethnicity, for whom begging assumes the value of a system of life . . . With respect to this delicate issue, it is important to clarify that the Supreme Court has long excluded that cultural traditions that foster begging may be excused . . . In the case of parents who oblige their children to beg, it is not possible to invoke the excuse of 'the exercise of the right' by appealing to the gypsy tradition of using children to beg. In fact, a tradition can have an excusing effect only if is cited by a law, according to the principle of hierarchy in the sources of the legal system". This 2012 Supreme Court argument represents the "classic" wrong invocation of cultural defence, in not recognising that in this case there was pathological behaviour in the parents' conduct as they would beat the child. This use of culture has been appropriately defined as "blaming culture for bad behaviour" (Volpp 2000) . The Italian legal framework described above shows that both the legislature and the judiciary adhere to the cultural narrative on begging, and both represent the begging affair as a multicultural conflict between an "us" (the Italians), and a "them" (the Roma). The reasoning underlying all the different statements, despite their different conclusions and nuances, can be summarised as follows: begging, and begging with a child, is something that does not belong to Italy at all; it is something strange and foreign: "they" have begged for thousands of years, it is "their" life-style; this life-style goes against our values, so "we" have to stop this "humiliating practice" that violates children's rights.
Furthermore, both judgements are an example of the unskilled (anthropologically speaking) way in which many judges manage the concept of culture. In both cases, the judge took what the lawyer said at face value, while neglecting to further investigate the nature of the custom, choosing to speak for the minority without any kind of consultation, and considering culture as something that simply happens within a group, following a pan-cultural approach.
I will argue that the framing of begging as an inter-cultural conflict is debatable both in its premise (assuming that begging is part of Roma culture) and in its conclusions (sanctioning child begging as a crime against children's dignity).
The first step in my criticism will consist of challenging the very idea that begging is a Roma cultural practice. I will attempt to demonstrate that both the 2008 and the 2012 judgements are examples of the judges' unskilled way of managing the concept of culture. In both cases, the judges took for granted what the lawyer said, without investigating further into the nature of the (supposed) custom/tradition of mangel (sections 2-5).
The second step in my criticism will consist of challenging the very idea that begging violates children's dignity. The new Italian law no. 94/2009 assumes this by construing it as a crime against the person, and imposing the loss of parental rights upon any parent that has his/her child beg. I will try to demonstrate that this approach, which breaks the unity of the family, is in violation of the Italian Constitution and of International law (sections 6-7).
Cultural defence, and legal cultural tests in courts
The judgements mentioned above are examples of cultural defence (Dundes Renteln 2004; Foblets and Dundes Renteln eds. 2009 ). Cultural defence is a judicial practice based on the fact that judges take into account arguments such as "it is my culture", or "my culture made me behave this way" in order to exclude/mitigate the punishment (in a criminal proceeding) or to determine differently the amount of damage caused (in a civil proceeding). This kind of judicial reasoning, which originated in the US courts in 1980, with some foreshadowing in the UK in 1970 (Woodman 2009 ), has dramatically increased in all multicultural societies even though it is not officially recognised in any legal system except in the criminal code of Peru.11 Using the cultural defence, judges act as "anthropologists", recognising the influence of culture in behaviour and taking it into account when carrying out justice.
Cultural defence developed both in those States whose Constitutions explicitly recognise cultural rights (e.g. Canada), and in those, like Italy, and the majority of the European States, in which the Constitution makes no mention at all of cultural rights.12 This jurisdictional practice may assume different forms in different States.13 In the attempt to develop clear standards to answer the intercultural challenges faced by multicultural societies, in recent decades "cultural tests" have been created, at the judicial level itself, imposing precise conditions for the use 11. Art. 15 Peruvian Criminal Code: "Those who commit a crime due to their culture or customs and cannot understand the criminal nature of their behaviour, or those who, although understanding the criminal nature, cannot act otherwise, will be deemed not responsible. When, for the same reason, this possibility will diminish, the punishment will be mitigated". This disposition was strongly advocated by Indigenous Peoples in order to avoid the criminalisation they suffered due to their different cultural behaviours. Some of those practices regarded children. For instance, indigenous people from Amazonia used to be accused of rape for having sex with girls under 14, while within their cultural system this was perfectly normal (Hurtado Pozo 2003) . 12. The category of cultural rights entered the legal language in 1966 and appeared throughout art. 27 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which states:
In those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist, persons belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right, in community with the other members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practise their own religion, or to use their own language.
It was the first time that "culture" stood as an autonomous right in a legal text. In fact, until that time, the law had recognised only parts of the broader concept of culture: mainly language or religion, and never culture per se. From international law, the recognition of culture as a right developed into national law. During the 1980s and 1990s, several Constitutions inserted cultural rights in their texts: today 50 Constitutions (there are more than 190 in the world) do recognise cultural rights. In spite of this increasing attention to the cultural dimension, the process of recognition of cultural rights is still in progress, and has suffered several setbacks due mainly to the challenges that cultural rights pose to the idea of equal treatment between citizens, and to the violation of other fundamental rights (e.g. children's rights, women's rights, integrity of the body, freedom of choice) that can derive from the recognition of "traditional cultures". Italy has at the moment no plans to change the Constitution to insert cultural rights, or to adopt a general Multicultural Act. The Legislature had intervened to repress specific cultural practices (e.g. law no. 7/2006 against Female Genital Mutilation), but generally the Judiciary is the main institution dealing with multicultural conflicts. 13. For instance, in US cultural defence, the behaviour of the defendant must be compared to that of the average person of their group (Dundes Renteln 2004) ; in Canadian cultural defence, the judge pays attention to the harm that the practice can cause. of cultural defence in courts (Ruggiu 2010 (Ruggiu , 2012 .14 Scholars have also endorsed the adoption of tests to assess a proper use of cultural defence (Dundes Renteln 2004; Eisenberg 2009 ).15, 16 These "cultural tests" vary according to jurisdiction, but there are some core questions that appear constantly, in the part of the test dedicated to ascertaining a practice's objective cultural dimension. They are:
(1) Does the group have that cultural practice? Definition of the practice in details. (2) Is it essential, compulsory or optional? (3) Is it distinctive (with respect to other customs of the majority)?
This attempt to formalise the cultural reasoning of a judge was made not only with the intention of setting limits, but also to offer a guide for the judge when dealing with the category of culture. For instance, the test's first requirement (detailing the cultural practice) avoids a general appeal to culture, such as "my culture made me do this" without specifying further. To detail the practice implies the judge's duty to study it in greater depth. A mistake all the Italian judges who decided begging cases committed was to rely solely on the position of the defendant. But who speaks for the minority? If it is true that the minority itself should be the privileged subject to decide what is cultural and what is not within a group, the consulted members should be independent spokespersons,17 not directly involved in the case and with no interest in using the cultural argument (e.g. to obtain a milder punishment for their conduct). Otherwise, the cultural defence may be used falsely or strategically, as probably 14. Such cultural tests arose in the US, in Canada, and at the international level (the UN Human Rights Committee). The first cultural test was forged by the Canadian Supreme Court in the case R. v. Van Der Peet, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 507, in order to identify the aboriginal rights of native people recognised in art. 35 Canadian Constitution. It consists of the following steps: 1) Defining the cultural practice in detail; 2) Is the practice essential and integral to the cultural survival of the group?; 3) Is the practice distinctive from the majority's customs?; 4) Is the practice pre-contact (did it exist before the arrival of the European in Canada)?; 5) Were the Natives consulted? This last question was inserted later, by the judgement Haida Nation v. British Columbia (Minister of Forests) [2004] S.C.R. 511. 15. Eisenberg's test consists of 3 questions: 1) Jeopardy condition: if the cultural practice is forbidden, will important elements of the group identity be put at risk?; 2) Harm condition: does the cultural practice cause any harm, be it physical or psychological?; 3) Validation condition: has the cultural practice been validated through a process of legitimation internal to the community? 16. Renteln's test consists of 3 questions: 1) Is the subject a member of an ethnic group?; 2) Does the group have that cultural practice?; 3) Was the subject influenced by that cultural practice when he acknowledged his/her behaviour? 17. For instance, in other multicultural conflicts Italian judges consulted: 1) rabbis, to understand the exact meaning of male circumcision in the Jewish context (Italian Supreme Court, Corte di Cassazione, VI criminal section, 24th November 2011, n. 43646); 2) consulates and embassies, to understand the exact meaning of the bearing of the kirpan, a long ritual knife, that a Sikh wanted to wear thus violating the guns and weapons prohibition in Italy (Tribunale penale di Cremona, 19 February 2009, n. 15). occurred in the begging cases in Italy. If the Italian Supreme Court, instead of relying on the defendant's statement and on a sort of "common knowledge" about begging, had applied the test, the results would have been different.
In particular, answering the test's first question -is begging actually a Roma cultural practice? -could have broken the judge's certainty, opening a Pandora's box of doubts.
Listening to the voice of the minority, in the debate that followed the 2008 judgement, the Roma raised at least three choruses.
(1) The majority of Roma activists18 and communities rejected the cultural argument, as mentioned above, stressing the economic nature of begging and its recent appearance in the Italian context (see section 1). (2) Some pro-Roma Italian activists accepted the cultural dimension of the Roma mangel, maintaining it is like questua (collection),19 based on the idea of relying on divine help to survive. This stance, which overturns the negative assessment of begging to make it a positive one, was criticised by the first group of Roma activists, who saw it as a form of romanticising begging, without taking into consideration the collapse that Roma culture suffered due to the urbanisation of Italy in the 1970s and the incapability of the Italian government to provide Roma people with a way of life better than that in the "nomad camps". (3) A third position emerged from individual Roma (no spokespersons) interviewed in the news, who showed no shame in begging or begging with a child.
Who is right with respect to the cultural nature of begging: the lawyers and judges who speak of a "thousand-year-old tradition", or the Roma activists who strongly deny this? Is begging something culturally related to the Roma? If so, what are the differences between mangel and the begging that any poor Italian or any poor person throughout Europe might practice? Is it essential to Roma culture? The test would have imposed upon the judge a more careful investigation of those questions. In jurisdictions where cultural defences are more established, judges often consult, in addition to members of the minority, and particularly if the contents of the practice are contested within the group itself, cultural experts as well (Rosen 1977) . They may be anthropologists, or academics with cultural knowledge of that particular group. Introducing an anthropologist into a trial as an expert witness opens up the broader issue of the relations between the law and technical knowledge outside the law. I am not claiming that the law should abdicate the particular characteristics of its own way of reasoning (which consists of balancing the different interests at stake) when dealing with a technical report, not only because the anthropologist him/herself can be wrong, but also because legal reasoning has its own features that should prevail: for instance, the fact that a behaviour is cultural (e.g. honour killing) is not itself a reason to acquit a person.20 At the same time, I recognise that in multicultural societies the judge's knowledge should expand towards the science that knows culture better: anthropology. The judges cannot be improvised or imprecise anthropologists, but should be very careful of how they manage the category of culture. In the following chapter, I will try to show which kinds of different answers the judge would have extracted if he or she had asked anthropologists about the nature of begging.
Is begging a Roma cultural practice? Answers from anthropology
Culture is a "contested concept" (Gallie 1956 ). Forged by a relatively new discipline -anthropology -in the first half of the nineteenth century, the concept began to undergo a process of definition and re-definition that is still in progress. In 1952 alone, anthropologists collected 162 different definitions of culture (Kroeber and Kluckholn 1952: 77-143 ) -a figure that has more than tripled today. Definitions start from the first provided by evolutional anthropology which saw culture or civilisation (the terms were then still blurred) as an "accumulation of human accomplishments" consisting of "that entire complex that includes knowledge, beliefs, ethics, law, customs and any other capacity or habits acquired by man as a member of a group" (Tylor 1871), provided to the latter by the interpretative anthropology according to which culture is "a web of meanings" (Geertz 1973 ), a semiotic space in which communication can occur as all the members within that space possess a common code.
The abundance of definitions reflects the difficulty of answering the question of how to define what is cultural and what is not within the large scale of a group's behaviour.21 Nevertheless, anthropologists generally agree that not every practice or behaviour that happens within a group, even with a certain frequency, is part of its culture. Culture is not simply what a group does. To measure the cultural nature of a behaviour/practice, certain conditions should 20. One of the mostly quoted cases of the Law renouncing its role and passively accepting the "verdict" of anthropology can be found in the US case People v. Dong Lu Chen, No. 87-7774, N.Y. Sup. Ct. Dec. 2, (1988) , in which a Chinese man killed his wife in a fit of jealousy. The judge sentenced Mr Chen to only 5 years' probation, saying that the report by the anthropologist Dr. Pasternak, an expert on Chinese culture, had demonstrated that in China, "shame" and "losing face" could have resulted in enough of a shock to lead Mr Chen to kill his wife. 21. Part of contemporary anthropology is even questioning the existence of something that may be called "culture" (Comaroff 2010). be met and respected. They are similar to the questions incorporated in the legal cultural tests adopted in the context of cultural defence. It is important to verify, for example, to what degree the behaviour is shared by the group and what value the group assigns it; if it is perceived as compulsory or merely optional; what its historical roots are; and if it is inter-generationally transmitted. If the behaviour is frequent but perceived as pathological by the group, it cannot be considered cultural.
Given this general framework, anthropologists strongly debated the nature of begging. While among the Italian Roma three lines of thought emerged (see section 2), among anthropologists begging has been defined in the following ways: the activity of the last society of "hunter-gatherers" living in the West (Formoso 1986 ); a form of resistance (Bohn Gmelch 1986; Kaprow 1991) ; a key to the Roma foundation myth (Fraser 1993) ; an economic strategy and a means of survival (Okeley 1995; Piasere ed. 2000a; Tesar 2012 ); a fake performance of marginality to exploit non-Roma (Asseo 1988 ); a deviant version of Marcel Mauss's theory of the gift (Piasere 2000c) . The many different voices and discourses on begging emerging within anthropology demonstrate how complicated the "simplistic" choice made by Italian judges to define begging as culturally related to the Roma is.
I will now proceed with a descriptive overview of the main positions emerging within anthropology, and later (see section 5) I will set out my conclusion regarding the nature of begging, explaining why I see it as an economic practice connected to other Roma cultural practices, but not part of their culture.
An initial anthropological reading of Roma begging defines it as "a form of gathering" carried out by the last society of "hunter-gatherers" living in the West. In defining the Roma as "a population of traveller/vendors and gatherers", Bernard Formoso (1986) looks at the Roma through the lens of evolutionary anthropology, as people who have remained at the stage of the first human societies in which gathering was a pervasive trait of all social and economic life. Formoso specifies that the object of the gathering no longer consists of the natural products that the land can offer, but rather of cultural products, such as money and other objects acquired through begging.
While Patrick Williams strongly criticised Formoso's position,22 in 1995 Leonardo Piasere, editing the book Comunità girovaghe, Comunità zingare, (Piasere ed. 1995a) , took Formoso's definition of begging as an evolutionary form of "gathering", and reread it through the lens of economic anthropology (Godelier 1974). 22. "We think of a gathering operation because we see a territory whose resources are accessible and some people ready to acquire them, but the sophistication of the operation, due to a passage from a natural environment to a social environment, makes the use of such notions inappropriate" (Williams 1986: 104) .
In this work, Piasere sees begging as "an economic strategy" (Piasere 1995b) adopted by the Roma to negotiate their values and aspirations within Western societies: "The Roma did not come to the West to sell their work, manual or intellectual, or to invest productive, commercial or financial capital; they did not come in order to enter the structure of the production or circulation of goods in the capitalist economic system. By contrast, they came to the West not with the intention of joining it, but of making a living by asking (begging) and/or taking (theft): both activities can be considered a form of gathering. It is clear that, unlike the hunter-gatherers who are normally the object of study by anthropologists, for the Roma the natural environment has less importance than the social environment" (Piasere 1995c: 347) .
Piasere describes the differences and similarities between "primitive" and "contemporary" hunter-gatherers: "for a gathering operation of any type, (three) elements are needed: a territory in which resources are accessible, persons . . . and tools. These are called the forces of production . . . The territory that the Roma preferably occupy is a city of large or medium size . . . An important characteristic of this economic activity (begging) is its general accessibility -by men, women, children and old people -as a means of survival. The pure act of begging does not require any particular tool or effort, or sophisticated knowledge. As with pickpocketing, just a small dose of ability is required" (Piasere 1995c: 348) . In describing how a group of Xoraxané Roma living in Italy organise their begging activities, moving from city to city, and taking care not to "annoy" the Gadgè too much with their constant asking, the author observes: "a gathering city/territory does not always offer the same quantity of resources. The gathering can be more if the human resources are not constantly exploited, if the land has some periods of rest. This implies the necessity of extending the economic space to other cities" (Piasere 1995c: 352) .
"The economic role" of begging, too, is stressed, in the same book Comunità girovaghe, Comunità zingare, by Judith Okeley (Okeley 1995: 275) .
Those studies done during the 1980s and 1990s do not deal directly with the question of whether or not begging is cultural. On the one hand, they show a way of living that is quite shared and embedded in Roma daily life, but at the same time they all stress the economic dimension of begging. It appears to be a practice the Roma "imported" from the outside and recast to serve, as I will better explain (par. 5), the Roma's other world views.
It is a later landmark research work on begging that better clarifies the issue of its cultural or non-cultural nature. The work I am referring to is entitled I significati della mendicità nelle culture zingare ("The meanings of begging in Gypsy cultures") (Piasere ed. 2000a ). Evocatively, "meanings" and "cultures" are in the plural.
An initial important position emerging in this work is the diversity of mean-ing that begging can have within the several Roma groups. Field studies show enormous differences in the gender division of the activity of begging, in its perception, and in its origins and continuity. For instance, in the Romanian Cortorari group, it is practiced mainly by men, and it is a recent activity, only accompanying more traditional activities such as selling horses (Tesar 2012: 116) .23 By contrast, among the Sinti Estraiχarja who live in Northern Italy, the activity is reserved for women (Tauber 2000) . Alessandro Simoni is sceptical of the cultural nature of begging, and suggests leaving the answer to the individual group. He observes: "among the groups that can be labelled Roma, the frequency, economic function, cultural dimension and features of child begging are extremely diverse" (Simoni 2009: 100) . For this reason, one wishing to read begging through the lens of culture should keep "the cultural nature of begging within the specific group to which the minor belongs, and not within a mythical 'Roma culture' that has more to do with stereotypes that with serious anthropological evidence" (Simoni 2009: 101) .
Given these positions, a second group of anthropologists writing in this work clearly refuse the cultural paradigm in favour of the economic one.
In his contribution, Leonardo Piasere states: "affirming that begging is part of 'the Roma culture' is nonsense (stupidaggine)" (Piasere 2000c: 421) . Piasere justifies this strong and clear position with the following argument: rather then "a long-lasting traditional activity sustained by internal models", begging is "a response to a process of pauperisation imposed from the outside and worsening over the centuries" (Piasere 2000c: 418) . The anthropologist arrives at this conclusion after a thorough analysis of begging since 1417, and his criticism of the cultural reading is particularly useful because it demonstrates that the supposed "thousand-year-old tradition" mentioned by the Italian Supreme Court in 2008 and 2012 needs to be deconstructed: the fact that begging is an old habit does not mean it belongs to Roma culture.
Actually, one of the main misunderstandings that lead to seeing begging as a traditional custom is the fact that it seems to have a strong historical dimension. In fact, begging accompanied the Roma's entry into Europe, and seems to be embedded in their foundation myth (Fraser 1993) . The first European written sources about the Romas' appearance in Europe, dated 1417, mention the begging activities practiced by Gypsies who presented themselves as Egyptians (Christian pilgrims coming from Egypt) who were travelling in Europe in order 23. "The typical Cortorari male wears a velour hat and black velvet trousers, knows how to hammer copper artefacts, and engages both in horse dealing at home and in begging abroad" . . . "The Cortorari earn their livelihood both through traditional domestic gender-differentiated economic activities -men engage in the manufacturing of copper artefacts and in horse dealing, women in pig husbandry -and, more recently, through gender-indifferent begging activities abroad".
to complete a pilgrimage aimed at expiating the religious sin of apostasy. Those false pilgrims would ask for and receive public offerings from public institutions happy to give. This first use of begging was defined by Fraser Angus as the "Great Trick". In fact it was a planned operation of earning money at the expense of the Gadgè (Fraser 1993: 60-84) .
Despite these ancient roots, it is precisely -and paradoxically -the very history of begging that proves it is something external to Gypsy culture. In fact, what the Roma were then practicing was a behaviour typical of the Christian pilgrims of that age. They were incorporating, for their needs, a practice "alien" to them: "using the form of mobility in the territory (pilgrimage) accepted at that time" (Piasere 2000c: 410) , they would ask for (and receive) public offerings that helped them in their (fake) pilgrimage. It is also important to note that the Roma did not rely on begging alone: "the activity of begging was never in isolation, but was always accompanied by divination, selling horses, staging circuses in town squares, and thievery" (Piasere 2000c: 410) .
This situation changed within a few generations: what had been pilgrims receiving public offerings from the villages became suspect, and institutions began to pay them to leave. By 1499, public offerings were no more: Gypsies "begged from door to door, " asking for private assistance (Piasere 2000c: 412) . The process of persecution and marginalisation had begun.
This does not mean that the Roma completely lost their agency with respect to begging: they in fact began to rationalise it. By begging, they professed marginality as a means of survival (Asseo 1988) , and, by keeping it outside of their cultural values, they developed an "adaptive capacity" to erase the shame otherwise implicit in begging (Piasere 2000c: 421) . In this context, the attempt made by Piasere to read begging into Marcel Mauss's theory of the gift is persuasive. This noted theory is based on the idea that all societies are based on "the gift" that serves to strengthen human relations. The scheme of the theory of the gift is a "giving-receiving-exchanging" triangle. In begging, this scheme is overturned and becomes "asking-receiving-(uncertain) exchanging", with these two chief differences: the asking breaks with the gratuitous nature of the gift (I am giving because somebody is asking, so there is no more spontaneity), and the exchanging is not certain, but postponed to some future benefits which will come from God, or from the good conscience of the donors. In this regard, Piasere quotes a Roma interviewee who states that by begging "I enable the good Christians to go to Paradise" (Piasere 2000c: 423) . With these nuances, begging remains an economic activity. The position of Leonardo Piasere in this respect has not changed, and he lately defined child begging as an "economic strategy" (Piasere 2013: 2) .
Elisabeth Tauber also tends to see begging as a prevalent economic practice. Her definition of mangel (mangapan in the Sinti community of Northern Italy she studied) is: "the modalities of Roma material and symbolic survival between Gadgè" (Tauber 2000: 391) .
The economic nature of begging finds more recent supporters in scholars of other disciplines (Matras 2010; Saitta 2010 ).
Is begging "essential" and "distinctive" to Roma culture?
Anthropology also helps answer the other questions of the legal cultural test aimed at assessing cultural recognition in courts (see section 2).
As for the test's second question (is the practice essential, compulsory or optional?), begging is neither compulsory for nor integral or essential to the survival of the Roma people as a cultural group. Particularly in Italy, begging appeared and disappeared throughout history: if it is true that it was part of their foundation myth (Fraser 1993) , until 1970, the Roma did not usually beg in Italy but were involved in traditional jobs. If the economic conditions were to change again, the Roma could easily go back to a way of life in which begging was not practiced.
Recent field research conducted in Italy by Angelica Pesarini -another author who maintains the economic nature of begging -demonstrated that: "Even though the recognition of Roma women's agency in using mangel as an economic strategy is important, they should not be associated exclusively with it. " As observed in this research, when alternative economic paths were offered, some of the women I met accepted them and could considerably improve their lifestyle (Pesarini 2013: 120) .
Piasere also stresses the optional nature of begging: "The vital importance of the extra-productive moment, like the domestic chores of women and free time for men, encourage begging only when it is needed and when resources have nearly run out" (Piasere 1995: 354) . In this sense, begging is more of an "adaptive response" by the Roma in a given "socio-economic environment" (Piasere 1995: 363) ,24 which can be reframed and abandoned in the face of changing circumstances.
Moving on to the third question of the cultural legal test, to obtain legal recognition a cultural practice should be distinctive with respect to the majority's other customs. The answer to this part of the test is controversial. On the one hand, Italians also beg, and when poor, begging is a way of making money in all European states. On the other hand, the lack of shame, the fact 24. In the case of Xoraxané Roma, "Those answers include changes in economic organisation, which in turn entailed considerable changes in the social organisation. For instance, the fact that children's human energy has taken on such exceptional importance in productive operations, has in subsequent years encouraged some heads of families to 'rent' sons from relatives and friends in Yugoslavia. This trend serves to maximise the child labour force over family ties" (Piasere 1995: 364) .
that Roma women consider begging a job, the fact that the Roma consider any form of making a living by "using" Gadgè legitimate, may be considered elements underpinning a distinctive dimension.
Even anthropologists who follow the economic paradigm agree that mangel doesn't have exactly the same meaning as begging: "mangapan means asking, persuading, working, selling at the same time" (Tauber 2000) ; "the feelings that those who really beg are only the poor Gadgè, and not the Sinti or Roma, is strong . . . Gypsy do not identify with the marginal people of Gadgè, they do not perceive themselves as declassed". With begging, "our economic categories are simply deconstructed and reconstructed with different borders. Not only begging is separated from poverty, but it is considered a form of marketing, in the sense of bargaining . . . Marketing is seen as an asking, urging, persuading. Persuading: bend the will of others to your own" (Piasere 2000c: 417) .
There is also another definition of Roma begging that tends to confer a distinctive dimension to it. According to Henriete Asseo, when the transition toward the new capitalist Europe began in the seventeenth century, the Roma adopted an alien practice like begging partly because they had no other economic choice, but also to profess marginality in the attempt either to escape forced proletarianisation, or to maintain, from their point of view, dominance over the world (Asseo 1988) . Miriam Koprow shares this view when she maintains that begging is a form of resistance to the disciplining and adaptation process that capitalist society wanted to impose upon the Roma (Koprow 1991).
If begging in many parts fails the cultural test, which at the moment is a possible legal guide for the recognition of a cultural practice in the courts, these considerations, in my view, reopen a question that had appeared solved. It seems that with regard to begging, there is a problem of "cultural translation" (Ricca 2008) : if Roma begging is not the same as Italian begging, are we perhaps dealing with some cultural dimension of it? To solve the dilemma surrounding the nature of begging, it is useful to return to a more inclusive definition of culture, and to look at Roma culture as an entire, comprehensive "web of meanings" (Geertz 1973) , in order to see what position begging has within it. In fact, if we remain mired in analysing begging alone, something may be lost.
Begging as an economic practice connected to other Roma cultural practices
In my opinion, the uncertainties among anthropologists and the Roma themselves regarding begging can be explained with the following consideration: begging, in spite of the fact that it is not a cultural practice in itself, involves and is connected to other Roma cultural practices. The first is the relationship between mother and child: Roma women are not used to being separated from their children, and have always involved them in their activities. In this regard, a statement on child begging made by Assemblée Générale des Roms de Bruxelles (2007) is quite interesting. After stating that child begging "is not inherent to Roma culture or to the parents' will, " the document affirms: "There are several reasons why certain parents prefer to take their children to the streets instead of sending them to school: the main cause is social exclusion and poverty", but it is also important to consider that: "culturally, the ties between the mother and the child are quite close: children in Romania do not go to school before the age of seven. Consequently, to separate from one's children when they are still small may be seen as a form of abandonment". Anthropologists agree that this is a cultural trait common to almost all Roma groups (Piasere, Saletti-Salza and Tauber 2003) . The second cultural practice implied in the begging controversy is the vision of childhood within the Roma "web of meanings": contrary to a child-centred Italian society, in which the child is perceived as a person in complete need of protection, the Roma have a different perception of caring for a child, and of his or her well-being (Piasere et al. 2003) . In every Roma group, children are involved in adult activities, without this being seen as a form of exploitation (Pantea 2009 ). Also "not distinguishing between space reserved for children and space reserved for adults" is an "intergenerational phenomenon" common "among different Gypsy groups" (Tauber 2004: 8-9) .25 A third cultural attitude that, in my view, influences the perception of begging as cultural is the concept of time among the Roma. "Every Roma wants to be the master of his or her own time, wants to fully administrate his or her day. What does this imply? Generally, the refusal of salaried jobs. Why have all States faced problems when attempting the proletarianisation of Gypsies? Since salaried jobs impose a rhythm that 'steals' your time, Gypsies have always refused it, or have accepted it only occasionally and temporarily" (Piasere 2013: 3) .
According to Judith Okeley, Roma women try to "avoid the boring salaried jobs", "they hate factories" (Okeley 1995: 256) ; "compared to a salaried job, 'asking' (begging) means working in private. This kind of job offers the opportunity of individual choices, free from men's control" (Okeley 1995: 276) . Roma in general may prefer begging to other kinds of more disciplined jobs, but again, this is not to say that begging belongs to their culture. It is an adaptive economic strategy that fits with their conception of time.
25. The author stresses that "children participate in all matters of life (except sex). Children go with their mothers to mangel (begging and selling); they accompany their fathers to negotiate with the Gadze when buying new caravans or cars; they are present when their relatives have problems with the police. They are present in family conflicts, conflicts between different families, fights between their parents, parties until late at night; they are also present at mourning feasts and funerals. When Sinti are chatting, negotiating, fighting, dancing, drinking, mourning -children are always there".
To summarise, the answer that seems to emerge from anthropology is that begging (and child begging) is not a cultural practice in and of itself, but can be connected to other cultural features. It is a consequence -in the present economic context of extreme poverty -of a particular idea of the mother-child relationship, of children's position vis-à-vis adults, and of the concept of time and of freedom that the Roma have. Those differences are not about begging, but about those other three customs.
A more careful judge interested in the cultural argument should have given attention to these cultural practices -more shared, and not contested among the Roma -rather than saying that begging was a cultural practice. But why? Looking at the cases from a legal point of view: why is it important to be anthropologically precise about begging? What matter is it for the law if begging is economic or cultural? And how would recognising these "true" cultural differences shape the treatment of Roma found begging with their children in Italy? The reconstruction of all the different perceptions of begging could seem to be a pure intellectual exercise for academics, and not at all important for the legislature that has to solve the problem of child begging. I think, to the contrary, that the correct anthropological framing of begging is highly important for a persuasive legal treatment of it.
First, the misleading use of culture has contributed towards perpetuating a narrative that stereotypes the Roma and does not help remove their structural discrimination. It is easier for the legislature to prohibit the "thousand-year-old cultural practice" and to frame it as a crime than to see begging as something that also entails Italian accountability, as the consequence of mistaken policies that increased marginalisation and the economic degradation of Roma living conditions in the "nomad camps" (Simoni 2005; Cherchi and Loy 2009; Bonetti, Simoni and Vitale 2011) .
The deconstruction of begging as a Roma cultural practice could have avoided providing a sort of "excuse" for the legislature, and for Italian public opinion in general, to do nothing to remove the economic conditions that lead the Roma to beg. If begging is "their" way of life, the cruel cultural way to treat "their" children, it is legitimate to legally prohibit it, and to remove Roma children from their family and oppressive culture for a better life.26 By contrast, if there is nothing to defend in begging, because it does not express any cultural value of the Roma people, being instead a stigma of their marginalisation, the answer cannot lie in criminal law, but in policies: this is something much hard-26. In this regard, see the declaration by Gianfranco Fini, former leader of the right-wing Alleanza Nazionale party: "I wonder how it is possible to integrate those who consider theft to be virtually legitimate and not immoral . . . or have children of their own for the purpose of begging. To speak of integration with people who have this kind of 'culture' is pointless". Fini: impossibile integrarsi con chi ruba, Il Corriere della Sera, 4 Nov. 2007.. er to do, and carries less impact in the political media. If the attitude adopted by the Supreme Court in 2008 can be judged as a wrong and unskilled way of managing the concept of culture, even if done in good faith, what followed after this judgement is no more excusable than ignorance, and can be classified as an example of multicultural populism reproducing the idea of a clash of civilisations (Hungtington 1996) , if not multicultural racism (Balibar 1991) . The framing of a conflict as a multicultural one created, in this case, a strong distance between an "us" (the Italians) and a "them" (the Roma), isolating the minority group instead of promoting its inclusion.
Second, a proper focus on proper cultural practices, instead of distancing the Roma from Italians, could have promoted intercultural reflection on the ways the two groups bring up their children.
While a Roma mother does not see a loss of the child's dignity in bringing him or her along to beg, the "cultural equivalent" in the Italian culture is sending children to kindergarten. Italian children in the past begged, today they do not beg any longer; Italian mothers have a completely different way of bringing up their children: they do not bring them to work; they send them to daycare from a very small age, even as young as 6 months. Italy acknowledges no form of a child's involvement in adult activities; the child is a child and child labour ceased decades ago. In this sense, even the interpretation given by anthropologists (Tauber 2000) that mangel is not begging, but also a means of work, would not have helped as a cultural defence, as it clashes with the Italian legal prohibition of child labour. But focusing on proper, shared practices -the mother-child relationship; the child's position with respect to adults -could have better helped trigger a dialogue between the two cultures. In fact, the difference between Italian and Roma mothers is not just about bringing your child to work with you, but concerns the general discussion of how to bring up a child, and of how to frame his-her relationship with the mother. For instance, some of the above mentioned Italian cultural practices are controversial: there is enormous debate in child psychology on the consequences of separating a baby from his/her mother and sending him/her to nursery school before 3 years of age. There are ways of raising children, such as sleeping separately or stopping breast-feeding too soon, which are perceived as a form of maltreatment in other cultures. There is also debate over the fact that a child-centred culture like Italy's is not always helpful to the child, who will turn out to be over-protected and sheltered from reality.
To conclude, the judge could have used culture as a justification but with another argument, such as: "the Roma child's position among adults, and the child-mother relationship, are elements that, in a setting in which the Roma are marginalised and economically compelled to beg, yield the result that they will bring their children with them. In so doing, they do not wish to humiliate or oppress their children, or to show less care. Until their economic marginalisation ends, they have no other remedy". An argument of this kind produces the same result -permitting child begging -but without removing Italian accountability with respect to their marginalisation.
At this point of my argument, a question remains open: should, then, child begging be permitted?
Having argued against the cultural nature of begging, I will now discuss a second criticism of Italian regulations and the judicial solutions to the begging issue. This criticism is wholly separate from the problem of the cultural or economic nature of begging, and is based on additional questions that were removed from or merely taken for granted in the public debate that followed the begging case, and were brought to the new legal framework after 2009: whether economic or cultural, does begging really violate children's dignity? It is again a sort of "common sense" that the reception the child has from those from whom it asks for money violates dignity, and that the structure of the begging child's relationship to the broader community is considered harmful to dignity. But is this an intrinsic element of begging, or does it depend on the idea of begging we have today? Was this idea always the case?
These questions lead us to a broader analysis on the activity of begging, its position in the system of values, and social imagery in Western societies. I will conduct a brief comparative analysis of the social perceptions and legal treatments of the practice, using some noteworthy examples. My aim is to demonstrate that begging does not violate children's dignity per se, and that criminalising child begging the way the Italian legislation has violates the child's rights under the constitution and international law.
Does begging violate children's dignity? Perceptions of begging through history, religions, and societies
Italy, 1930. In a town near Naples, an Italian man is begging in the streets. According to art. 670 of the criminal code, just enacted by the Fascist regime, beggars are guilty of a criminal offence, punished alongside vagabonds, alcoholics and other antisocial persons for violating the legally protected value of "public tranquillity".27 The man is sentenced to prison. Italy, 1980. Franciscan monks go from road to road to practice the questua. They have done so since the Middle Ages when the Popes recognised the "beggars' order" as followers of the Gospel's message. They do not fall under the purview of art. 670 of the criminal code, as that code provides as an explicit excuse "the exercise of a right" (art. 51), and they are exercising their freedom of religion (art. 19 Italian Constitution).
Burma, 2015. It is early morning, and queues of young monks aged between 6 and 15 exit a pagoda, black wooden bowls in hand. They scatter in the streets and markets of Yangon, in order to beg. The people who place an offering in their bowl thank the monks: in fact, the monks will help them "acquire merits" that will improve their karma (the sum of positive and negative actions), both for this life and for the life hereafter.
Italy, 2015. It is Sunday Mass: Christian believers place their offerings in a basket that is passed along during the ritual. Children and altar boys often pass the basket along. The offerings will be used for charity as well as for the upkeep of the Church and to maintain the priests.
These examples show a single event -that of asking money -which receives very different social, and legal treatments. Religious begging has been generally accepted throughout European history, whereas economic begging has not.
From a historical point of view, the perception of begging for economic reasons has deeply changed within Italian law.
In 1889, a few years after Italian unification (which took place in 1861), the Zanardelli Criminal Code confirmed the crime of begging (for adults and children) already existing in the code of the Kingdom of Sardinia and Piedmont. The new Rocco Criminal Code, enacted in 1930 under Benito Mussolini, under art. 670, did likewise. When the democratic Constitution was approved in 1948, this norm was challenged before the Constitutional Court for having violated the new constitutional framework.28 It took three different pronouncements by the Constitutional Court before adult begging became completely legal in Italy, in 1995 Italy, in : judgement no. 51/1959 judgement no. 102/1975; and, in the end, judgement no. 519/1995. At first, the prohibition against begging was seen as a violation of art. 38 of the new Constitution, which recognises the "freedom of private assistance". In judgement no. 51/1959, the Constitutional Court confirmed the prohibition, stating that begging was not at all connected with private assistance, and that it offended "public tranquillity".
Sixteen years later, art. 670 of the criminal code was challenged again. Italian society had deeply changed in the meantime. The 1968 movements had completely redesigned the social landscape. According to an initial argument raised by a trial judge who supported the unconstitutionality of art. 670, the new Constitution implied the existence of a "freedom to beg". In fact, even if it was not explicit, it was ingrained in the "freedom of expression" enshrined by art. 21 of the Constitution. The judge who raised the case stressed that by begging a person expresses:
28. In Italy, access to the Constitutional Court is not direct for citizens, as in Spain, but requires a judge's mediation. If any judge has to apply a law that appears to violate the Constitution, he or she can ask the Court to make a pronouncement. The Constitutional Court can either abolish the law or inform the judge that he or she was mistaken in considering it unconstitutional. a free dissenting ideology against the life standards that prevail (are dominant) in the society into which the subject is inserted, an ideology that expresses a freedom of choice, values and behaviour. The unconstitutionality of the norm is embodied in the repression of any activity that does not conform to the retributive scheme, thus punishing subjects belonging to socially well-defined groups that are generally marginalised: gypsies, hippies, the unemployed, the disabled.
With judgement no. 102/1975, the Constitutional Court refused to recognise this "freedom to beg" as part of "freedom of expression", stating:
the criminal repression of begging does not restrict those rights (freedom of expression), and is not an indirect coercion of people who refuse to work. With regard to citizens who do not work for the precise reason of freedom of expression, it is not possible to recognise the right to ask others to provide for their upkeep.
Despite refusing the position of those we could call "ideological beggars", the Court, on this occasion, made an important concession to "economic beggars" saying that those who beg because they have a physical disability or because they have no one who can legally provide for their essential needs" and "are induced to beg out of a lack of public assistance", are justified under the "state of necessity (art. 54 of the criminal code), and should not be prosecuted.
Even though art. 670 was not declared unconstitutional, with this new interpretation, beggars for economic reasons were no longer prosecuted.
Twenty years later, with judgement 519/1995, the Constitutional Court eventually declared art. 670 to be in violation of the Constitution.
The Court completely changed its orientation, accepting the argument of the trial judge who presented begging as one of the consequences and products of capitalist society. The economic cycles of capitalist societies inevitably produce a "number" of people who are excluded from the economic cycle for a while, or forever. In this sense beggars are victims of an unfair economic system. In the words of the Constitutional Court: the imbalances and the strong tensions that characterised the more advanced societies produce situations of extreme marginalisation . . . Trends or temptations aimed at 'concealing' misery and at considering poor persons as dangerous or criminal must be avoided. These trends sadly revert to seeing begging as a social deviance . . . which led, during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, to the institution of ghettos for beggars. But social conscience has completely rethought the behaviours considered dangerous for coexistence. Civil society, conscious of the State's incapacity, has activated several responses, such as volunteering, which is based on the constitutional duty of solidarity enshrined in art. 2 of the Constitution.
The Court abolished article 670 of the criminal code, defining begging as perfectly constitutional, in accordance with the constitutional duty of solidarity.
In other words, the Constitutional Court sees begging as a peaceful means of redistributing money where the State has failed to do so.
There is no trace of this historical legal evolution, and of this Constitutional reading of begging, in the current Italian debate. The mantra of "children rights" is used to produce an automatism between begging and the loss of human dignity, but in my opinion the Italian legal system cannot dissociate the treatment of adult begging from the treatment of child begging in so strong a way: nowadays, adult begging is perfectly accepted and activates our duty of solidarity, whilst child begging goes against human dignity. Apart from an intrinsic disproportionality in this, I also see traces of a structural discrimination. Once fewer Italians beg, and begging becomes a practice associated with immigrants and marginalised ethnic groups, Italy forgets its constitutional history. There is the risk of reverting to the fascist attitude, which considered begging an antisocial conduct, even though, in truth, it violates no constitutional value. To confirm this reading of what is taking place in Italy it is important to note that from 2008 to 2011 the activity of (adult) begging was prohibited in several City Councils by administrative means (Rossi 2010) . In fact, law no. 125/2008 accorded to city mayors the new power to enact ordinances to protect street furniture and urban security. Using this power, many cities began to sanction people who begged with a fine of 25 to 500 euros. Apart from the irony implicit in demanding money from people asking for money themselves, making begging illegal in this backhanded fashion is quite a serious matter. In fact, in this way, a behaviour that since 1995 had been considered perfectly legal became an administrative violation.29 I suggest that seeing begging as a degrading practice that violates human dignity is connected to an underlying system of values that refer not to the Constitution but to the economic structure of society. In fact, in a society based on capitalist values such as productivity, competition, and the self-made, begging is an extremely negative and antisocial activity. The beggar is perceived as a parasite on society, somebody who lives on the shoulders of the working people who enable the economy to develop. The power of the redistributive/capitalist pattern is demonstrated by the fact that, before judgement no. 519/1995, jurisprudence would exclude the crime when the beggar accompanied the request for money with any kind of material (pencils, shoe-strings, tissues and the like) or immaterial (playing music) offering in exchange. The simple fact of giving a pencil was considered less antisocial than begging without offering some-29. This law was declared unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court (judgement no. 115/2011), as the power given to the mayors failed to respect the principle of legality because it was too broad and allowed the mayors to prohibit any conduct at all. Other States in Europe have recently seen a comeback of anti-begging legislation: More than 500 arrested in Dublin under begging law, The Irish Times, 31 Oct. 2011 . A very similar situation occurred in the UK with nomadism (Williams 1990; Kabachnik and Ryder 2013). thing back: and in those case judges would not convict people. In my opinion, more than compromising constitutional values, begging -with its structure that implies receiving something for nothing, following the scheme of do ut des -challenges the values of a Western/capitalist society.
I would add that criminalising begging violates Italian social conscience and culture. For instance, the Catholic religion itself, deeply entrenched in Italian mentality and cultural life, does not see begging as anything bad. Although beggars do not play as important a role as in Buddhism, they are respected, and are seen as persons with difficulties, in need of help, and to whom the Church and Christians share a duty of charity. Furthermore, many saints were beggars: they had left their daily activities and entrusted their sustenance to divine providence. Also, many clerical orders today live on offerings given freely by believers or volunteers. In this regard, Piasere notes: "In the new Italian environment, the Roma established ambivalent relations with the locals. On the one hand, as foreigners without residence permits, they are constantly sent away by the police trying to drive them outside the borders; on the other hand, the persistence of a form of Catholic conformism, according to which alms (elemosina) are seen as an act of Christian charity, allows them to occupy the 'begging niche' that the modern system of assistance tried to eliminate, but whose existence has always been accepted in Italian popular culture, both rural and urban" (Piasere 1995: 348) .
If the above mentioned social, religious and cultural narratives demonstrate the changing ways of perceiving begging through history and societies, to deepen our analysis and see whether begging infringes upon children's dignity, it is important to look at the juridical framework that designates the child's position within society to verify whether the Italian solution is consistent with it.
7. Does begging violate children's dignity? Answers from the constitutional and international legal framework.
The essential Italian constitutional dispositions regarding children are art. 30,30 31,31 3432 and 37.33 From those norms enacted in 1948 there emerges a highly rigid 30. Art. 30: "1. It is the duty and right of parents to support, instruct and educate their children, even those born outside of matrimony. 2. In cases of the incapacity of the parents, the law provides for the fulfilment of their duties". The duty-right pairing serves to prevent the parent from perceiving this function as an unlimited power. 31. Art. 31: "1. The Republic assists, through economic measures and other provisions, in the formation of the family and the fulfilment of its duties, with particular regard for large families. 2. It protects maternity, infancy and youth, promoting the institutions necessary for such purposes". 32. Art. 34: "1. Schools are open to all. 2. Elementary education is imparted for at least eight years, [and] is obligatory and free". 33. Art. 37: "1. Working women have the same rights and, for equal work, the same wages as working men. The working conditions must allow women to carry out their essential role in the position regarding the juridical condition of the child. Defined as a "minor", it is mentioned only as someone to be protected in the family, at school, and in work settings. The "minor" is a vulnerable subject and the provisions are concentrated not on his rights, but on the duties and responsibilities of other persons with regard to him/her. These duties are of the parents, the schools, and the political institutions. In 1948, this position was highly advanced, as it served to leave behind the earlier view of the child as a "resource" for the family and for society; today, however, this position is debatable. In fact, a new consideration is emerging of the child as an autonomous subject, with his/her own personality, and with a capacity for choice. This new perspective has been better developed on the international level. For instance, in the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) signed in New York in 1989 and ratified by Italy, alongside the classic view of the child as vulnerable (e.g. the Preamble recognises that "childhood is entitled to special care and assistance") are articles emphasising his/her autonomy. First, the child is no longer defined as a "minor", a word that seems to express that he/she is "incomplete". Second, one of the key provisions -art. 12 of the Convention -affirms the duty to listen to the child's opinion.34 From this provision we might argue that the child should have a say in deciding whether or not to be removed from a family that had him/her beg.
This view is reinforced if we observe that, according to art. 9, the child is entitled to the right not to be separated from its parents.35 This article develops what is stated in the Preamble, where the family is seen "as the fundamental group of society and the natural environment for the growth and well-being of all its members and particularly children". The family "should be afforded the necessary protection and assistance so that it can fully assume its responsibilities within the community".
Given those provisions, I do not think that the Italian criminal solution regarding child begging is respectful of the international legal framework. The solution chosen by law no. 94/2009 introducing art. 600 octies into the crimfamily and ensure special adequate protection for the mother and the child. 2. The law establishes the minimum age for paid labour. 3. The Republic protects the work of minors by means of special norms and guarantees them, for equal work, the right to equal pay". 34. Art. 12: "1. States Parties shall assure to the child who is capable of forming his or her own views the right to express those views freely in all matters affecting the child, the views of the child being given due weight in accordance with the age and maturity of the child. 2. For this purpose, the child shall in particular be provided the opportunity to be heard in any judicial and administrative proceedings affecting the child, either directly, or through a representative or an appropriate body, in a manner consistent with the procedural rules of national law". 35. Art. 9: "1. States Parties shall ensure that a child shall not be separated from his or her parents against their will, except when competent authorities subject to judicial review determine, in accordance with applicable law and procedures, that such separation is necessary for the best interests of the child. Such determination may be necessary in a particular case such as one involving abuse or neglect of the child by the parents". inal code, which imposes the loss of parental rights if a mother takes a child to beg, is worse in terms of constitutional and international violation than the one that permits child begging. This provision infringes both art. 30 of the Italian Constitution and art. 9 CRC. In fact, by using begging, Roma children can be declared adoptable and definitively separated from their original family (Simoni 1999; Morozzo della Rocca 1991) . Furthermore, in the case of the Roma, adoption by Italians would also infringe children's cultural rights, as recognised in art. 30 CRC36 (Tavani 2012) .
Proof that the present legal solution is debatable lies in the fact that it is not being enforced. In much of Italy, it is still possible to see Roma children begging in the streets with their parents. The police tend to enforce laws on begging rackets, but not ordinary family begging. Social conscience is also divided: while some still report mothers and parents who have their children beg, the majority shows sympathy, or indifference, meaning that seeing a child begging is not perceived on a par with seeing a child being beaten or forced into sex work.
It is also important to note that the struggle between the legislature's strict stance and the judiciary's milder one with respect to child begging is still an open one. As discussed in par. 1, the intention of art. 600 octies introduced by law no. 94/2009 was also to punish parents who used children to beg (e.g. keeping them in their arms or nearby), even if the children were not directly begging themselves. Despite this norm, the Supreme Court intervened in 201137 to acquit a Roma woman who was begging on a busy street with a baby several months old in her arms. The public prosecutor, denouncing the baby's suffering caused by the noise and pollution on the busy road, wanted the woman to be convicted. The Supreme Court deemed that the woman was "working", and at the same time "taking care and breastfeeding the child, keeping her in her arms" so there was no maltreatment or suffering at all.
To conclude, looking at history, societies, cultures, and the very dictates of Italian and international law, I would suggest that that begging per se cannot be said to be a violation of the dignity of the child, unless there are other circumstances -for instance, the child is kept out of school in order to beg; the child is forced to beg; begging is exploited by a racketeering organisation; the child begs in conditions that are dangerous for its health (on a road that is too heavily trafficked, or with cars that imperil his/her safety).
A final point merits analysis. My defence of begging as a neutral practice, not humiliating for the child and not in violation of human dignity, might 36. Art. 30: "In those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities or persons of indigenous origin exist, a child belonging to such a minority or who is indigenous shall not be denied the right, in community with other members of his or her group, to enjoy his or her own culture, to profess and practise his or her own religion, or to use his or her own language". 37. Corte di Cassazione, Criminal Section, n. 22511, 7 June 2011.
be accused of concealing a subtle form of discrimination. Given the fact that in contemporary Italy only Roma children beg, whilst Italian children do not (Vanorio 2008) , claiming that child begging should not be punished could be read as abandoning Roma children to their destiny. The underlying message -no matter what the nature of begging is -is that a Roma child deserves less protection than an Italian one. I think that to solve this conundrum, the role of the judges is crucial: using the existing norm against maltreatment (art. 572) they could investigate, on a case by case basis, whether begging is being done in conditions of maltreatment. I am not claiming that the decriminalisation of begging should lead to inertia by the legislature in intervening with policies aimed at removing the conditions of marginalisation in which the Roma are trapped. What I am claiming is that the criminal tools are disproportionate, and not appropriate to face the problem. They even make it worse, placing at risk other rights of the child, such as the right to be brought up in his/her original family.38
Conclusions. Restoring the legal treatment of begging to the Constitution
In this article, I have explored the many narratives and discourses produced by the Roma, anthropology, and Italian Law regarding begging. Begging has been alternatively defined: by the Roma as an economic means of survival, or a religious questua; by the Italian legal system as a humiliating practice, freedom of expression, an ideology of dissent, a consequence of an unfair economic system, a peaceful way to redistribute resources, a violation of children's rights, and an offense against human dignity; by anthropologists as a form of resistance, the milestone of the Roma foundation myth, an economic strategy, a performance of marginality to exploit non-Roma, the activity of the last society of "gatherers" living in the West, and a variation of the Marcel Mauss' theory of the gift. Instead of taking this richness of definition into account, Italian Courts have made a debatable use of the cultural defence based on the assumption that begging is a Roma cultural practice. I have also described the new Italian legal framework on begging that strongly criminalises persons and parents who bring their children along to beg.
38. Another possible risk in repressing begging can be that of increasing theft, and further exacerbating social tension and the criminalisation of the Roma. In this regard, it may be interesting to report an experience I had personally, in 2010, when teaching an "Introduction to Constitution and Citizenship" course to a group of 15 Roma women from the Monserrato nomad camp near Cagliari (Sardinia, Italy). After I explained law no. 94/2009 to them and suggested they refrain from taking their children along to beg, the women reacted unanimously, saying: "this is unfair. What are we to do now? If they prohibit us from begging, the only thing left for us to do is steal". I have attempted to question both of the assumptions made by the Italian judiciary and legislature: that begging is a cultural practice, and that it violates children's dignity. I claim that begging appears prevalently to be an economic practice that has arisen as a consequence of marginalisation.
I have argued that the fact that child begging is practiced only by a marginalised group has fostered a process of "othering" the activity of begging as something that belongs to a foreign, alien cultural group: that of the Roma people. Italy fails to see Roma begging embedded in its unjust social structure, which is economically and symbolically incapable of integrating the Roma.
I have also questioned the notion underlying the present legislation, that begging is something humiliating and shameful for human dignity. In criminal legislation, begging is placed on a par with sex work. I have argued that this image of begging is typical of capitalist societies where people are accustomed to receiving "something for something", but it is a behaviour perfectly consistent with other principles rooted in the Italian Constitution and even in Italian culture (Catholic culture, for instance). I am not maintaining that begging should be promoted or accepted with resignation, but I have suggested that the present legal criminal framework is too strict, and does not treat begging with all the nuances that must be taken into account. For these reasons, I suggest de-criminalising the treatment of child begging, and leaving to a case-by-case approach, entrusted to judges, the solution of the hard cases in which begging, for the duress under which it is practiced, rises to being a form of maltreatment.
The attitude of the Italian Supreme Court and the legislature is an example of how culture may contribute towards misunderstanding a group. Instead of initiating a dialogue with the Roma, and of using these cases to cast into discussion and pluralise Italian ideas of childhood, only one monolithic view of begging emerges: the idea that child begging is a cultural practice and a violation of human dignity in any circumstance. In this way, not only are other world views underappreciated, but the very values of the Italian Constitutionsolidarity, sharing and equal social dignity -are forgotten.
